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Labour Party Adaptation to Multilevel Politics:  
Evidence from British General Election Manifestos 
 
Abstract 
Some policy areas debated in British general elections are the responsibility of devolved institutions, 
not the UK parliament. Devolution means that state-wide parties produce different versions of their 
general election manifestos in the devolved territories. Deploying a multi-level party framework, this 
article examines intra-party variation in Labour’s manifesto content through an original study of 
British, Scottish and Welsh Labour party manifestos from 2001 to 2017.  The analysis focuses on the 
content and structure of Labour’s general election manifestos across the UK.  It examines the roles 
performed by these documents, revealing how the Labour party has responded to the challenges of 
devolution.  The analysis highlights the variable speeds at which sub-state parties embrace autonomy.  
It finds that Welsh Labour is more inclined to diverge from the content of UK Labour manifestos than 
the Scottish party, suggesting Scottish Labour has been slow to understand the politics of national 
identity and reluctant to embrace opportunities created by devolution.  The article has implications 
for three key literatures: approaches to manifesto analysis; the roles performed by party manifestos; 
and party adaptation in multi-level systems. 
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Labour Party Adaptation to Multilevel Politics:  
Evidence from British General Election Manifestos 
 
Devolution means that distinct policy agendas exist in different parts of the UK, and many policies 
debated in UK general elections do not apply at the sub-state level. Consequently, state-wide parties 
produce different versions of their manifestos across the UK.  It might therefore appear that the 
modern general election manifesto lacks a clear purpose in devolved settings. This article explores the 
extent of policy differentiation at the sub-state level in British Labour party manifestos, and examines 
the role and relevance of these manifestos in a multi-level, devolved political system. This is important 
because the way in which state-wide parties handle policy divergence between the state and sub-
state levels in their general election manifestos is an indication of how parties adapt to multi-level 
conditions.  
The British Labour party is of particular interest due to its central position as a state-wide party 
delivering and governing devolution in the UK. Since the early days of devolution, the electoral 
fortunes of Scottish Labour, Welsh Labour and the state-wide party have diverged markedly. Now only 
the third party in Scotland and in opposition at Westminster from 2010, Labour in Wales is a long-
term party of government. The content of Labour’s general election manifestos offers insight into the 
party’s strategic approach to managing devolution and policy diversity, and why it has been challenged 
electorally in Scotland.  
We begin with a brief discussion of the roles performed by party manifestos, and this is followed by 
an account of the UK Labour party in the context of multi-level politics.  Theoretical accounts of multi-
level political parties lead to expectations of increasingly distinctive sub-state profiles within state-
wide parties, in both devolved and general elections.  The discussion then outlines the methods and 
approach deployed in the analysis before moving on to address the structural characteristics of 
Labour’s general election manifestos since devolution in 1999, including variation in their treatment 
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of devolved policy and national identity. Through this comparison of Scottish, Welsh and British 
versions of the manifestos, we consider the roles they perform for Labour at the sub-state level. 
Findings highlight Labour’s varying strategies in the territories of Britain, and differences in how sub-
state parties within a state-wide party organisation embrace autonomy.  In this way, we respond to 
Harmel’s (2018) call for more research into how and why manifesto content develops and can vary 
between and within parties.1 
The role of general election manifestos 
Manifestos perform a number of roles (Kavanagh, 1981; Ray, 2007; Harmel, 2018). They are commonly 
viewed as the basis of mandate theories, containing election pledges which parties promise to 
implement if elected to government and conferring legitimacy on policies they enact.  Manifestos also 
contribute to responsible party government. Voters can hold a party to account in the subsequent 
election if it has not delivered on its manifesto pledges. Not all parties are serious contenders for 
government, however. As a result, manifestos may take on more symbolic significance and be used to 
highlight a party’s broad philosophy, identity and values. Ray (2007: 17) observes that manifestos may 
also be used as advertisements for parties, aimed not directly at the election to hand, but at building 
support for some future electoral contest. 
Three ideal types of manifestos can be linked to party goals: (i) Contract/mandate manifestos prioritise 
office seeking, containing many specific pledges for the immediate election. They will be associated 
with parties most likely to form an administration immediately after an election; (ii) Advertisement 
manifestos aim to build support in the immediate election, but also to situate the party for 
forthcoming elections. This might involve explicit effort to build up credibility for a state-wide election 
or regionally; and (iii) Identity/principle manifestos involve articulation of parties’ ideal policies or 
ideological values. These manifestos are associated with parties unlikely to enter government, either 
at state or sub-state level, where compromise is unnecessary. In multi-level political systems, 
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manifestos can also be used to communicate sub-state, regional or local identities (Clark and Bennie, 
2018).    
These manifesto roles are not mutually exclusive – manifestos can exhibit elements of all three – but 
various incentives and reasons exist for one role being more prominent than another. Parties with 
realistic objectives of gaining office may offer more moderate policy proposals than parties with no 
ambitions to govern, where the emphasis is on articulation of values and policy ideas rather than 
winning votes or taking office. The dynamic nature of parties’ incentive structures in elections is 
captured by models which emphasise vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking goals, 
suggesting that a range of electoral, organisational and institutional conditions shape party strategies 
(Strom, 1990; Wolinetz, 2002; Dolezal et al, 2018).   
The implications of devolution for state-wide parties’ general election manifestos, and the roles they 
perform, have not been widely explored. In most states, parties now operate in complex multi-level 
environments where institutions have different powers and state-wide parties grant their sub-state 
organisations varying degrees of policy autonomy (Mazzoleni, 2009; Allen and Mirwaldt, 2010). It is 
therefore insufficient when assessing parties’ general election strategies to focus solely on the state-
wide level. Devolution produces varying patterns of electoral competition and manifestos potentially 
perform different roles at state and sub-state levels. How parties view institutions impacts upon their 
goals. A party unlikely to be part of a state-wide government may prioritise the sub-state institution; 
one dependent on the regional level for representation state-wide may prioritise the state parliament. 
Multi-level environments mean there can be trade-offs between two or more institutions.  
Labour, multi-level politics and general election manifestos 
British Labour is a good example of a state-wide party facing diverse electoral competition at different 
political levels. Table 1 documents the party’s general election results since devolution. Labour was 
historically strong in both Scotland and Wales. More recently, the fortunes of the party in these 
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countries have diverged. Scottish Labour’s support was eroded by the SNP, culminating in a 
catastrophic loss of seats in 2015. In 2017, the party recovered somewhat, benefiting from a UK-wide 
increase in Labour support, and to some degree a decline in the SNP vote relative to the Conservatives.  
However, Labour finished behind both the SNP and the Conservatives in Scotland. Welsh Labour, in 
contrast, continues to dominate, attracting close to 50% of votes in 2017. The party’s success has been 
linked with an effective strategy of emphasising ‘Welshness’ to counter its nationalist competitor 
(Bradbury, 2015).  
TABLE 1 
Elections to devolved institutions, employing a more proportional electoral system, underline this 
story of Welsh Labour resilience. Labour has continuously been in government in Wales since 1999, 
sometimes alone, sometimes in coalition with the Liberal Democrats or Plaid Cymru, and the party 
experienced relatively stable leadership from the time Rhodri Morgan became leader in 2000. 
Following the 2016 Welsh Assembly elections, Labour had 29 from 60 seats, leading to formal 
cooperation with the one Liberal Democrat Assembly Member.  
Labour led the early years of the Scottish Parliament, in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, but from 
2007 support fell away. Scottish Labour’s leadership lacked continuity. The death of Donald Dewar in 
office was followed by a rapid turnover of different leaders.  (Between 1999 and 2017, there were 
eight Scottish Labour leaders, compared to the SNP’s two.)  By 2016 Scottish Labour had been reduced 
to the third largest party in Scotland, with 24 from 129 seats. For the first time since devolution, Labour 
was overtaken by the Conservatives.   
As in other European countries with federal or multi-level political systems, relationships between 
levels of government in Britain are complex. The Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly have powers 
in important areas of public policy, including education, health and social services. Over time, these 
competences have evolved, enhancing the status of both institutions in stages. However, the Scottish 
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Parliament has always been the more powerful of the devolved institutions, with Wales playing ‘catch-
up’ over two decades.  Indeed, Scotland has provided motivation for advocates of a stronger model 
of devolution in Wales. 
When established, the Scottish Parliament was set apart by its fiscal powers (though a 3p tax varying 
power was never used). These fiscal levers were later strengthened, most significantly by the 2016 
Scotland Act which followed the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence.  Income Tax, a portion 
of VAT and some welfare provisions are now devolved.   The Welsh Assembly in 1999 was limited in 
its law-making capacity but more meaningful devolution followed.  In 2011, a referendum indicated 
support for an enhanced model of devolution in Wales.  The Wales Act 2017 involved a move towards 
a reserved powers model of devolution (enacted in Scotland from 1999) and extended financial 
powers like borrowing and the ability to vary income tax.  This also gave the Welsh National Assembly 
the power to change its name to Senedd.  In this way, over two decades in UK politics, devolution has 
been strengthened and entrenched but the Scottish Parliament continues to have more powers than 
the Welsh Assembly.  With no separate English parliament in the UK, attempts by the Conservative 
government to introduce measures known as ‘English votes for English laws’ confirms the 
asymmetrical nature of devolution in the UK. 
Adapting to these changing conditions is challenging for parties. Fabre (2008: 309) notes the tension 
in state-wide parties ‘between party unity, cohesion and centralization on the one hand, and diversity 
and internal decentralization on the other’. It is expected that multi-level political systems lead state-
wide party organisations to formally cede power to the sub-state level. Sub-state elites gain flexibility 
to adapt to local electoral circumstances, particularly when the party competes with ethno-regionalist, 
autonomist or non-state-wide parties (Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006; Laffin et al, 2007).  This can result 
in notable policy diversity within the same party.   
Faced with a significant nationalist presence in Scotland and Wales, Labour has gradually ceded power 
internally to its sub-state organisations, allowing freedom to develop local policy agendas and profiles. 
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This has not been easy.  While responsible for introducing the devolved institutions, the party itself 
was centralised and slow to adapt its internal structures (Hassan and Shaw, 2012). Former Labour 
leader in Scotland Johann Lamont famously claimed that the UK leadership treated the Scottish party 
like ‘a branch office of London’.2   Nevertheless, formal structures have gradually been modified. There 
has been increasing freedom for the Scottish and Welsh parties in the areas of leadership, candidate 
selection and policy formation (Laffin et al, 2007). The 2011 Refounding Labour reforms meant 
Scottish and Welsh leaders gained formal authority over their parties (previously they were party 
leaders in the legislatures).  
When it comes to the policy content of state-wide general election manifestos, the sub-state parties 
are perceived to have considerably less latitude and influence than in devolved elections (Carter and 
Ladrech, 2007; Moon and Bratberg, 2010). In practice, sub-state party elites are charged with adjusting 
the state-wide general election manifesto to reflect sub-state politics and devolved policy.  Regional 
elites adapt manifestos and make ‘strategic choices over how far to follow the central party line’ (Laffin 
and Shaw, 2007: 65).    
Formal processes are only part of the story, with ‘ideational structures, norms and competing 
ideologies/discourses’ shaping debates within multi-level parties (Moon and Bratberg, 2010: 55). In 
other words, informal processes such as sub-state values and discourses are important in 
understanding intra-party relationships. They suggest a degree of central party tolerance and 
flexibility in Labour, with the party in Scotland and Wales perceived to have ‘freedom to manoeuvre’ 
and respond to electoral circumstances (Laffin et al, 2007: 104). Whether sub-state elites embrace 
these opportunities is another question. Although Scottish Labour has more formal organisational 
autonomy, it has been suggested that Labour in Wales has developed the stronger regional discourse 
(Moon and Bratberg, 2010; Scully, 2017).  
The expectation is of an increasingly distinctive sub-state profile in a state-wide party, in both 
devolved and general elections. Finlayson (2005), for example, points to English-Welsh-Scottish 
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differences becoming clearer over time. Labour’s recent experience of being in opposition at 
Westminster and in Scotland leads us to expect this process to intensify, as state-wide parties tend to 
be less controlling when in opposition (Fabre, 2008). Furthermore, as nationalist parties threaten the 
electoral standing of Labour, we would expect Labour in opposition to develop a clearer sub-state 
profile.  Therefore, more individuality might be expected in Scotland than in Wales. Devolution is 
stronger and more entrenched in Scotland, Labour has been in opposition for a considerable time, a 
strong Scottish identity exists amongst voters, and the SNP has experienced a period of 
unprecedented electoral success. Such conditions, Fabre (2008: 318) argues, ‘should strengthen the 
asymmetry between the Scottish and Welsh branches of the state-wide parties.’   
However, there are also reasons to expect Welsh Labour to demonstrate diversity, related to its 
uninterrupted status in government and relative continuity in leadership. Plaid Cymru has been a less 
effective challenger party to Labour than the SNP, more narrowly associated with promoting the 
national language, and independence is seen as less viable by the electorate.  As a result, Labour in 
Wales has enjoyed governing status for a prolonged period, at a time of increasing autonomy for 
Wales.  Being in power can give a sub-state party more clout – more confidence to assert itself – within 
the national party organisation (Fabre, 2008); and stability in leadership potentially permits a more 
sustained focus over time. 
Data and approach 
These issues are explored by examining the content of Labour’s general election manifestos. There 
has been little analysis of territorial diversity in manifestos. They have been used to explore discourses 
of nationalism in Scotland (Leith, 2008; Leith and Soule, 2011). Shephard (2007) examined Scottish 
Labour general election manifestos in 2001 and 2005, noting overlap between devolved and reserved 
issues.  However, there have been few attempts to compare the wider content of Scottish, Welsh and 
British versions of general election manifestos (but see Clark and Bennie, 2018).   
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Manifesto analysts have been inventive in designing methods to examine them. Different techniques 
have been deployed to undertake varying forms of content analysis. Most analyses of manifestos focus 
on party policy positions, relating them primarily to saliency and spatial theories of competition 
(Budge et al, 2001; Mazzoleni, 2009; Allen and Bara, 2017). Often, this takes the form of validating the 
reliability of measures and methods of coding manifesto content (Laver et al, 2003; Ray, 2007; Pappi 
and Seher, 2009). Less often, manifestos are used as indicators of political culture and elite discourse 
(Finlayson, 2005; Leith and Soule, 2011). 
Work on manifestos has been predominantly quantitative, counting word usage, so-called quasi-
sentences, sub-headings and the space given to various topics. Difficulties in doing so have been 
discussed elsewhere (Budge et al, 2001; Laver et al, 2003; Ray, 2007). While quantitative content 
analysis has yielded valuable insights, it can only identify the number of times topics are mentioned, 
the space allocated to them and so on. It cannot tell us about meanings associated with words, nor 
how topics are presented to create a particular impression of a party, its goals and the role of the 
manifesto in an election.  A more qualitative approach is required.  Allen and Mirwaldt’s (2010) 
analysis of British, German and French manifestos was based on a qualitative reading of selected 
documents to identify general underlying themes, as they describe: 
By actually reading the manifestos … we were able to analyse mentions of democracy in their 
full context and to explore more fully changes in the way political parties have talked about it 
(Allen and Mirwaldt, 2010: 875). 
We adopt a similar approach but the qualitative reading of manifestos is complemented with some 
basic word counts in order to provide a clear sense of differences between manifestos and the roles 
they perform. British, Scottish and Welsh versions of Labour’s manifestos from post-devolution British 
general elections between 2001 and 2017 are analysed.3 We examine the characteristics and content 
of the manifestos, with the expectation that Labour has adapted them to take account of devolved 
circumstances. 4  Analysis begins with a brief account of sub-state spending on general election 
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manifestos and then examines the structure, policy content and national identity discourse of the 
documents. The aim is to explore variation in manifestos in British general elections, to understand 
their different territorial uses.  
Characteristics of Labour general election manifestos 
Spending on manifestos  
The resources devoted to producing manifestos is an indicator of how parties perceive and utilise their 
manifestos.  In multi-level political systems, spending tends to reflect the relative power of institutions 
(Bratberg, 2009; Dolezal et al, 2012; Brunsbach et al, 2012).  Table 2 examines Labour expenditure on 
manifestos in the constituent parts of Great Britain from 2001 to 2015.5  By 2015 there had been a 
marked decline in spending overall, probably due to online distribution.  As a proportion of overall 
spending, expenditure in England gradually rose to 80% by 2010, before falling to 71% in 2015. In 2005 
and 2010, the party spent more on manifesto production in Wales than in Scotland. However, there 
was a higher spend in Scotland than in Wales in 2001 and 2015.  
TABLE 2 
With the SNP expected to dominate after the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, increased 
spending on the general election manifesto in Scotland suggests some attempt (however futile) to 
dedicate more resources to Scotland and shore-up party support.6 The general pattern of spending 
suggests that the powers of the respective institutions drive strategic decisions about party spending 
on manifestos (Clark and Bennie, 2018: 256).  
Structural aspects 
The structure, style and format of manifestos vary considerably (Merz and Regel, 2011). Manifestos 
can be leaflet or pamphlet style, like a magazine or brochure, or even take the form of a book, as was 
the case for the Labour manifesto of 2017. Layout varies, including the use of chapters to separate 
topics, the inclusion of pictures or photographs, the use of party branding and the manner in which 
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text is presented. These variations are used by parties to convey messages and themes. Many of these 
features can be compared across parties and time. Additionally, manifesto length (in pages and words) 
has been used as a proxy for the importance parties attach to their manifestos (Shephard, 2007; 
Brunsbach et al, 2012).  
There appears to be little relationship between the length of Labour manifestos and whether the party 
is in office, either at the UK or sub-state level (Table 3). As for territorial diversity, the clearest 
characteristic is the similarity of word length across the manifestos, with one exception. In 2010, the 
Welsh manifesto is considerably shorter. By 2015, the Welsh document is longer than its counterparts, 
and in 2017 the three documents again look similar in length.7 The number of chapters each year is 
near identical but the Welsh manifesto of 2010 has an extra chapter and a distinctive configuration of 
chapter themes. Instead of specific chapters on health, education and so on, chapters deal with broad 
themes like ‘protecting services’ or ‘standing up for the many’.   
Over time there is similarity in the use of photographs and pictures between the British and Scottish 
documents. 2010 is again notable in the case of the Welsh manifesto, this time for the proliferation of 
photographs. A total of fourteen pictures illustrate the document, including images of the Welsh 
national flag, a castle, wind-turbines, and some ‘ordinary’ members of the public. A shorter manifesto 
containing illustrations does not necessarily lack substance and can be an effective campaigning 
document, but it is notable that in 2015 and 2017 fewer pictures were printed in the Welsh manifestos. 
Overall, the use of pictures has fluctuated considerably, but photograph usage in the Scottish case is 




Each manifesto contains a preface or foreword by the UK leader and, usually, Labour’s Scottish and 
Welsh leaders. In 2001 all manifesto versions relied heavily on images of the UK leader, Tony Blair, 
supplemented by a few pictures of sub-state leaders. Prefaces in 2001 and 2005 adopted a consistent 
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model; an introduction by the UK leader, followed by statements from Scottish and Welsh leaders 
(First Ministers and Secretaries of State). More recently, the leadership emphasis appears to be 
changing, with sub-state leaders more prominent (Table 4). In 2010, both British and Scottish 
manifestos had a brief foreword by the state-wide Labour leader Gordon Brown, himself a Scottish 
MP.  In Wales, the statement by Brown is not used. Instead a foreword was written by Peter Hain, 
Secretary of State for Wales, and Carwyn Jones, the First Minister for Wales. In 2015, the state-wide 
leader Ed Miliband is prioritised over the Labour leader in Wales but not in Scotland. By 2017, sub-
state figures take precedence with forewords by Labour leaders in Scotland and Wales printed before 
those of Jeremy Corbyn. 
TABLE 4 
TABLE 5 
The title and structure of the documents provide further insight into sub-state distinctiveness (Table 
5). In the immediate post-devolution elections (2001 and 2005) ‘Britain’ is simply replaced with 
‘Scotland’ or ‘Wales’. There is no difference in the titles of Labour manifestos across Britain in 2010. 
In 2015, Wales adopts the same title as the state-wide party. In 2017 three separate titles are used. 
What is now widely regarded as an effective Labour manifesto title, ‘For the Many Not the Few’, did 
not appear in the Scottish or Welsh documents.  
In nearly all years, therefore, the three versions of the manifesto are close to uniform in chapter 
structure and organisation, but with some symbolic attempts to acknowledge sub-state identities.  
2010 was exceptional, with Welsh individuality clear. This uniformity in Labour manifestos points to 
state-wide, office-seeking motivations at play in a general election. It suggests the dominant role of 
the manifesto is one of seeking a state-wide contract or mandate. However, a closer examination of 
the documents’ content in the following sections points to other roles being performed 
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simultaneously by general election manifestos, namely the articulation of a party’s identity and 
advertising for future elections at the sub-state level. 
Devolution and policy diversity 
A critical question is how state-wide parties handle reserved and devolved policies in their manifestos. 
In many areas, a complicated inter-relationship exists between devolved policies and those that 
remain the domain of UK government. Shephard (2007: 187) argues that in 2001 and 2005, ‘Labour 
largely ignored the implications of devolution for the issues that they would campaign on for the 
Westminster election’. Through comparison of British, Scottish and Welsh versions of general election 
manifestos over a longer period, we now explore how Labour deals with the policy consequences of 
devolution.  
Devolution addressed 
The manifestos directly acknowledge the challenges posed by devolution. Initially, in 2001, there is 
reference to how devolution has necessitated three versions of the document. The British document 
explicitly mentions the existence of Scottish and Welsh manifestos, thus:  ‘The proposals and statistics 
in this chapter refer to England; reform programmes for Scotland and Wales are detailed in the 
Scottish and Welsh manifestos’ (Labour manifesto, 2001: 18). Early manifestos provided considerable 
detail on the powers of the UK government and responsibilities of the devolved institutions. In 2010, 
the Scottish document adds an introductory paragraph dealing with reserved and devolved powers: 
Scottish Labour will fight every election on our commitment to all those things which 
matter most to Scottish families and workers; the economy, jobs, crime, schools and 
hospitals. Devolution means that many of these issues are decided in the Scottish 
Parliament.  Where responsibility is reserved to the UK Parliament, Labour will deliver 
the commitments made in this manifesto in the next Parliament.  Where responsibility 
is devolved, Scottish Labour will endeavour to deliver for Scotland from opposition in 
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the Scottish Parliament... We will carry these commitments through into the next 
Scottish Parliament. (Scottish Labour manifesto, 2010: 0:3) 
Latterly, the British manifestos outline commitments to extending the powers of the sub-state 
institutions, with devolution ‘gathering pace’ (Labour manifesto 2015: 63). In 2015, this involves a 
package of reforms to UK government and devolving power to English cities and regions, and a UK 
Constitutional Convention. These commitments are more detailed in the Scottish and Welsh 
manifestos. Following the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, there was all-party support for 
strengthening the Scottish Parliament. This is reflected in the 2015 manifesto, which refers to the 
energy created by the referendum. The Scottish leader’s introduction points to the Scottish Parliament 
becoming ‘one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world’, with new powers over tax, 
jobs, welfare and borrowing (Scottish Labour manifesto, 2015: 6). Welsh Labour’s manifesto aims for 
‘parity with Scotland on the model of devolution’ (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2015: 65). 
In 2017, there is a slightly different approach. The British document states that constitutional change 
is pressing due to the outcome of the Brexit referendum, and there will be consideration of federalism. 
Sections on Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are succinct, containing very little detail. Less than 
125 words are dedicated to Wales. Devolution is given more attention in the Scottish and Welsh 
documents. The Scottish manifesto refers to the threat of another independence referendum. In some 
places, for example arts policy, the Scottish manifesto points to ‘English’ proposals and states that it 
would be up to the Scottish government to decide on whether to ‘follow [UK] Labour’s lead’ (Scottish 
Labour manifesto, 2017: 93). 
The Welsh version highlights new powers for the Welsh Assembly, including over policing. Notable 
detail, not found in the Scottish document, appears in the chapter on ‘Negotiating Brexit’, calling for 
a ‘fundamentally different constitutional relationship between the devolved governments and the UK 
government’ when the UK leaves the EU (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2017:23). However, both sub-state 
documents call for a ‘presumption of devolution’ where EU powers automatically transfer to the 
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regions/nations of the UK; and both emphasise that budgetary decisions taken by the UK have knock-
on spending effects in devolved areas. Overall, there is considerable detail on devolution and the 
evolution of the sub-state institutions, with Wales making the case for equality with Scotland.  
Policy detail: reserved and devolved areas 
The sub-state documents rely heavily on a British template. In reserved policy areas like taxation and 
international relations the manifestos are close to identical, but the template is modified to reflect 
Scottish and Welsh contexts, often with very slight modifications in language. A common strategy on 
reserved matters is to provide details of how state-wide policy is implemented in Scotland and Wales. 
Throughout the documents, UK figures are provided and then backed up with details on Scotland and 
Wales. For example, the 2017 Welsh document refers to the recruitment of 10,000 more police 
officers, which would mean 853 new officers in Wales (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2017: 71). 
Devolution means that some public policies proposed for England (in some cases England and Wales) 
do not apply at the sub-state level. We would therefore expect that ‘English’ policies would be 
removed from the Scottish and Welsh documents. This is evident. Sometimes specific policy detail is 
replaced with a general statement of principle. In 2010, major health policies which do not appear in 
the Scottish document include private services (alternative service provision) and enhancing patient 
choice. The discussion is less detailed than its British counterpart, with vaguer commitments.  
Whether sub-state parties add accounts of policy developments in the devolved institutions is an 
important question. In fact, extensive material is added to reflect policies in Scotland and Wales, with 
quite different accounts of areas like transport, agriculture, tourism and so on. In 2001, Scottish and 
Welsh manifestos give prominence to free bus travel for pensioners and the disabled, a policy passed 
by both institutions in the early days of devolution. There are many references to policies introduced 
‘since 1999’. Sections dealing with public services, health and education depart from the British 
document, increasingly so from 2010, citing policies ‘made in Scotland/Wales’, although many phrases 
and  introductions to sentences are similar, revealing continued reliance on a ‘master’ document.   
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In 2017, the Scottish party points to ‘English’ Labour’s policy of free school meals for all primary school 
children to be paid for by removing VAT tax exemption on private schools, and states ‘Scotland would 
benefit from the Barnett consequentials of this policy, which would allow it to be replicated here’ 
(Scottish Labour manifesto, 2017: 42). 
Similarly, Welsh Labour largely follows the British document but emphasises the distinctiveness of 
Welsh Labour policy. In health, Welsh manifestos emphasise Labour achievements in Wales, from new 
hospitals to increased staff numbers. The party argues that it defended the NHS against Conservative 
cuts and rejected top-down reorganisation and privatisation. In 2015 and 2017, unlike Scottish Labour, 
the party in Wales can argue that it has ‘delivered’ various policies such as increased training 
opportunities for young people (apprenticeships) and a Living Wage for NHS staff.  
Citing recent policy achievements makes the Welsh manifesto more distinctive and longer. In the early 
years of devolution, Scottish Labour was similarly able to describe policies implemented during its 
time in government, 1997-2007, while avoiding mentioning this was in coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats. Indeed, the extent to which Labour could realistically claim ownership of many policies in 
Scotland between 1999 and 2007 is questionable. Assessing this period of devolved government, one 
former Labour Scottish First Minister suggested that ‘the Liberal Democrats have probably gained 
more from devolution than any other party’ (cited in Laffin, 2007: 665).   In opposition, Scottish Labour 
manifestos contain more critiques of the governing party. The Welsh manifesto, by contrast, continues 
to praise the government in Wales, with multiple references to the achievement of the ‘Labour-led 
Assembly government’. Welsh Labour is simply able to report more on sub-state policy delivery.  
Throughout, there is a theme of partnership and interdependence between state-wide and sub-state 
government. In 2005, Scottish Labour (2005: 45) refers to ‘joint responsibility’ between Westminster 
and Holyrood in crime and policing, and ‘tough new anti-social behaviour legislation in Scotland 
backed up by national security legislation introduced by the Labour government.’ This acknowledges 
the interdependence of institutions but leads to confusion about which level of government is being 
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discussed. ‘Our record in government’ is frequently stated but it is not always clear which government 
is being referred to. Reserved and devolved powers are frequently conflated. For example: 
‘A Tory Government would put at risk much that Welsh families depend on: tax 
credits for people on modest incomes; free prescriptions; free bus travel for older 
people; free breakfasts in primary schools, tax-free winter fuel payments.’ (Welsh 
Labour manifesto, 2010: 2).  
There is, in sum, clear evidence of Labour outlining a record of past legislative achievements – relating 
to the state-wide parliament as well as the devolved institutions (the latter being not strictly relevant 
in a British general election). This demonstrates the complexities of devolution, ambiguity in the 
reporting of policy and a blurring of jurisdictions by parties. It also challenges any suggestion that the 
only purpose of a general election manifesto is the seeking of a contract or mandate to govern at the 
UK level.  The attention paid to the devolved institutions suggests a state-wide party that is attempting 
to use its manifestos for more long-term purposes, sending a message about its position at the sub-
state level, potentially using a general election manifesto to advertise for devolved elections.  This 
idea is explored further in the next section. 
Advertising for devolved elections 
To what degree does the party outline its policy plans at the devolved level? With devolved elections 
in Scotland and Wales a year later than the 2010 and 2015 general elections, there might be a certain 
amount of long-term electioneering or positioning, which would be a form of advertising for future 
elections. There is evidence of this. Proposals from 2010 and 2015 on devolved areas of responsibility 
go on to appear in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly manifestos of 2011 and 2016. Table 6 
demonstrates some of the overlap between the documents, making parts of the general election 
manifestos look like advertising.   
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Several approaches are apparent. First, some key general themes are repeated. Secondly, a general 
commitment in 2010 or 2015 turns into a more concrete, fleshed-out or ambitious proposal in 
subsequent devolved elections in 2011 or 2016. For example, Welsh Labour in in 2015 promises to 
scale back the Right to Buy Scheme, pointing to ending the scheme in ‘the next Assembly term’. The 
2016 document confirms the end of the scheme and provides more detail on how this will be achieved.  
TABLE 6 
Alternatively, some ‘devolved’ policies are removed or watered down, likely in response to 
intensifying financial constraints. Between 2010 and 2011, a Scottish commitment on class sizes is 
removed. Commitments on young people and regeneration of towns become weaker. In 2016, a 
number of less ambitious proposals appear in the Welsh Assembly document. In housing, the 2015 
manifesto promised 200,000 new affordable homes a year by 2020, but the 2016 Assembly document 
only commits to 20,000 in the next term. 
New commitments are also revealed in 2011 and 2016, as in all manifestos, some reflecting changes 
in strategic direction. In 2016, then Scottish leader Kezia Dugdale introduced a new ‘anti-austerity’ 
pledge, a commitment to use the Scottish Parliament's taxation powers to stop cuts to public services. 
Nevertheless, the manifestos for the devolved elections contain many policies which first appeared in 
general election manifestos, providing evidence of an advertising function. 
Party competition also shapes the content of manifestos to a degree. Another indicator of whether 
parties in general elections have an eye on devolved elections is how they deal with competitors (Table 
7). Until 2017, Scottish Labour manifestos unequivocally presented the Conservatives as their principal 
opponents. The SNP was mentioned infrequently, the Liberal Democrats not at all. By 2017, the SNP 
is referred to 39 times. This suggests that ten years after losing power to the SNP at the sub-state 
level, Scottish Labour eventually recognised a need to respond to the dominant party in Scotland in a 
UK-wide general election, although the Conservatives are still framed as the main political threat. In 
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Wales, portraying the Conservatives as the main competitor is even more apparent. This suggests that 
Labour is focused on the immediate major opponent at the UK level – the Conservatives – but for 
Scottish Labour there is belated recognition of the SNP’s challenge, in both devolved and Westminster 
elections. 
TABLE 7 
So far, the analysis has revealed that Labour’s general election manifestos are a mix of: (i) publicising 
past achievements in the state-wide and sub-state institutions; (ii) publicising policy ideas for 
Westminster and devolved elections; and (iii) criticism of party opponents at Westminster and in the 
devolved settings.  This suggests that Labour uses general election manifestos to perform multiple 
functions, combining immediate office-seeking objectives (the mandate role) with that of situating the 
party for forthcoming elections in the devolved territories, a form of advertising.  These amount to 
two of the three ideal types of manifesto roles outlined earlier.  However, to what extent does a 
Labour general election manifesto also promote the party’s identity, the third main role?  The next 
section addresses this question by examining the national identity discourse of Labour general 
election manifestos.   
Scotland, Wales, Britain and the Union: Discourse and Identity 
State-wide parties have to be British, English, Scottish and Welsh in appeal. The nuanced language of 
a manifesto provides insight into how parties approach national identity (Leith and Soule, 2011: 42).  
Table 8 assesses the national identity discourse of Labour manifestos in Scotland and Wales, revealing 
shifts over time. 
In the early years of devolution, the Scottish documents contain more references to Scotland/Scottish 
than the equivalent terms in the Welsh manifestos. However, in 2010, Welsh Labour intensifies its 
regional identity, and downplays the theme of ‘Britishness’, using the terms Britain or British rarely 
(13 times). In 2010, Scottish Labour is almost as likely to refer to Britain, British or the UK as the state-
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wide party, and the Scottish party is most likely to refer to the Union. Welsh Labour, in sharp contrast, 
is significantly less likely to refer to Britain or the UK. It does not specifically mention the Union at all, 
and is twice as likely to use the terms Wales/Welsh as Scottish Labour is Scotland/Scottish. In 2010, 
again, it is Welsh Labour which demonstrates distinctiveness.  
TABLE 8 
This leads us to question how the Union is portrayed by the sub-state parties. In 2010, Scottish 
Labour’s commitment to the British union of nations is clear. The Scottish manifesto presents a strong 
defence of the Union, evoking the image of a social union. It discusses the founding values of the 
welfare state and its role in ‘binding’ the nations of the UK: 
The welfare state, in its broadest sense, is the most profound expression of the shared 
values that bind Scotland and the other nations of the United Kingdom together in a 
social union… A National Care Service would be a further strand in the social union… It 
will be different in each nation of the UK, but will reflect our shared values. (Scottish 
Labour manifesto, 2010 6:5). 
The Welsh manifesto of 2010 (when Labour was in coalition with Plaid Cymru in Cardiff) is less overt 
in its ‘Britishness’, more focused on Wales. There is a stand-alone chapter on ‘A strong, open, self-
confident Wales’, which celebrates ‘Wales’ diverse, modern culture’. There is extensive discussion of 
pride in the Welsh language, portrayed as a ‘vital element of Welsh self-confidence’, and devolution 
is described as bringing a ‘new sense of Welsh identity’ (Welsh Labour manifesto, 2010: 23).  
By 2015, a recalibration has occurred. In the Welsh document, usage of the terms British/Britain has 
increased again and in 2017 has the same frequency as the Scottish manifesto. Over time both Scottish 
and Welsh Labour make more use of the term UK/United Kingdom, but alongside an increase in 
nation-specific language (Scotland/Scottish or Wales/Welsh). However, in 2017 Welsh Labour remains 
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considerably more likely to refer to Wales/Welsh than Scottish Labour is to use the equivalent terms, 
appearing no less than 441 times in the Welsh manifesto.   
The analysis suggests that the Labour party in Wales has overcome an early ambivalence towards 
devolution. It confirms the existence of a ‘Welsh way’, promoted by Rhodri Morgan, Welsh First 
Minister between 2000 and 2009, widely interpreted as a distancing from UK Labour (Hopkin and 
Bradbury, 2006; Bradbury, 2015). Despite the weaker model of devolution in Wales, Welsh Labour has 
a history of ‘not following the (UK) government’s lead’ on public sector reform (Laffin et al, 2007: 66). 
Moon and Bratberg (2010: 57) point to a different Welsh Labour discourse, or ‘clear red water’ 
between it and the state-wide party, a phrase first used by Morgan in a speech in 2004 and attributed 
to his adviser, Mark Drakeford, Welsh Labour First Minister from December 2018.8  Scully (2017) 
similarly describes a ‘Welshing-up’ strategy, with a clear emphasis on the Welsh Labour leader (then 
Carwyn Jones), and a ‘wholly separate Welsh manifesto’.   
Leith and Soule (2011: 55, 59) state that Labour in Scotland adopted a ‘low-level nationalist stance’, a 
‘mildly nationalist-neutral position’, which contrasted vividly with the SNP.  Our analysis echoes this 
theme.  Scottish Labour has at times been limited in its nationalist discourse, both in comparison with 
the competitor nationalist party and with Welsh Labour.  It has been reluctant to employ manifestos 
as statements of sub-state or Scottish identity. It is only in 2017, three years on from the 2014 
independence referendum, that there is any significant discussion of independence (explaining why 
the party is against a second referendum on secession).  
There are therefore signs that Scottish Labour is now aware of the importance of national identity 
discourse and is prepared to speak the language of its competitors in Scotland. After nearly two 
decades of devolution, it appears that the party is finally showing flexibility at the sub-state level, 
fostering the development of a sub-state identity in its manifestos.  These findings confirm that 
Labour’s general election manifestos are multi-functional. While the state-level mandate function 
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appears to be the dominant role, the manifestos also advertise for devolved elections and transmit 
the party’s sub-state identities.   
Conclusion 
This article has addressed the roles performed by state-wide party manifestos and how modern 
parties adapt to multi-level settings. Through a detailed, original reading and analysis of manifesto 
content, it has demonstrated that there is considerable value in qualitative analysis of manifestos. This 
has shown how manifesto structure, content and design can be used to convey particular messages 
and meanings to voters. Such an approach complements, but also moves the debate beyond, 
quantitative accounts of policy position and salience. Through a multi-level party framework, the 
article has uncovered how state-wide parties develop different territorial emphases in general 
elections, in a far from uniform manner. The various roles of manifestos – from mandate through to 
advertising and identity functions – and how these are balanced lay bare the strategic priorities and 
choices made by territorial party organisations. What is striking about the Labour case is how slow 
Scottish Labour appears to have been to adapt to the challenges posed by the party’s nationalist 
competitors. By contrast, Welsh Labour has carved out a clear identity within the broader party which 
has kept Labour at the forefront of Welsh politics. Similar analyses can be made for other parties, in 
different settings. Instead of treating parties as unified state-level actors, manifesto analysts should 
reflect the messier form of multi-level political organisation found in most states and take account of 
how parties actually campaign in contemporary democracies. This would develop our comparative 
understanding of parties and their manifestos yet further.  
1 We are grateful to participants at the March 2018 ‘Manifesto Co-ordination in Multi-Level Settings’ workshop 
at Universitè Libre de Bruxelles and Waseda University for feedback on an earlier version of this paper. We are 
also grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful comments. 
2  See: ‘Johann Lamont resignation: Scottish Labour leader stands down immediately’, BBC News, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-29765415 [25/2/2019].   
3 For consistency, we refer to the British manifesto throughout because it covers state-wide issues and matters 
reserved to Westminster, even though, with policy areas devolved to Scotland and Wales, it is often referring to 
England.       
4 See Appendix Table A1 for a full list of manifestos analysed. 
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5 2017 figures were not available at the time of writing. We are grateful to Katie Hamilton at the Electoral 
Commission for providing the 2015 data.  
6 Labour lost 40 Scottish seats in 2015. 
7 We refer only to the English-language version of the Welsh Labour manifestos in this paper.  
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Table 1: Labour’s general election results since 2001 
 England Scotland Wales 


















2001 41.4 61.0 323 43.3 77.8 56 48.6 85.0 34 
2005 35.5 54.1 286 39.5 69.5 41 42.7 72.5 29 
2010 28.1 35.8 191 42.0 69.5 41 36.2 65.0 26 
2015 31.6 38.6 206 24.3   1.7   1 36.9 62.5 25 
2017 41.9 42.6 227 27.1   11.9   7 48.9 70.0 28 





Table 2: Labour manifesto expenditure in UK general elections, by region  
 2001 2005 2010 2015 
 £000’s % total £000’s % total £000’s % total £000’s % total 
England 397 76 261 73 276 80 66 71 
Scotland 65 13 47 13 32 9 15 16 
Wales 57 11 49 14 37 11 12 13 
Total 519 100 357 100 345 100 93 100 
Source: Electoral Commission Register of Campaign Expenditure, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/   






Table 3: Features of Labour general election manifestos 
 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
 Brit Scot Wales Brit Scot Wales Brit Scot Wales Brit Scot Wales Brit Scot Wales 
N pages 44 44 44 112 112 113 75 74 52 86 96 87 123 119 113 
N words 30,807 28,681 28,494 24,012 24,063 23,538 30,277 28,466 13,901 18,964 18,304 21,463 24,560 23,733 25,480 
N chapters 5 5 5 9 9 9 10 10 11 7 7 7 13 13 13 
N pictures 34 37 34 1 1 1 0 0 14 24 24 15 41 37 21 
-UK leader 6 6 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 2 1 
-Regional  
   figure  
 2 3  0 0  0 0 0 2 1 0 2 4 
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Table 4: Foreword/preface of Labour general election manifestos 
 Britain Scotland Wales 
2001 Lab Leader (Blair) 
 
Lab leader (Blair); 
Sec of State for Scotland 
(Liddell) & First Minister 
(McLeish) 
Lab leader (Blair); 
First Minister (Morgan) & Sec of 
State for Wales (Murphy) 
2005 Lab Leader (Blair) 
 
Lab Leader (Blair); 
Sec of State for Scotland 
(Darling) & First Minster 
(McConnell) 
Lab Leader (Blair); 
Sec of State for Wales (Hain) & First 
Minister (Morgan) 
2010 Lab Leader (Brown) 
 
Lab Leader (Brown) 
 
Sec of State for Wales (Hain) & 
First Minister (Jones) 
2015 Lab Leader 
(Miliband) 
Scottish Lab Leader (Murphy); 
Lab Leader (Miliband) 
Lab Leader (Miliband):  Welsh Lab 
leader and First Minister of Wales 
(Jones) & Shadow Secretary of 
State for Wales (Smith) 
2017 Lab Leader (Corbyn) Scottish Lab leader (Dugdale); 
Lab leader (Corbyn) 
Welsh Lab leader and First 






Table 5: Titles of Labour manifestos 
 Britain Scotland Wales 
2001 Ambitions for Britain Ambitions for Scotland  Ambitions for Wales 
2005 Britain Forward not Back Scotland Forward not Back Wales Forward not Back 
2010 A Future Fair For All A Future Fair For All A Future Fair For All 
2015 Britain Can Be Better Scottish Labour Manifesto Britain Can Be Better 





Table 6: Policies in 2011 and 2016 Scottish Parliament/Welsh Assembly manifestos appearing a year 
earlier in general election manifestos 
Scotland 2011 
• Cancer care right to see a specialist and get results within two weeks 
• Tackling knife crime, with a minimum mandatory sentences for carrying knives  
• A Victims’ Commissioner  
• In schools, commitment to 2 hours PE per week (5 hours in 2010 British document)  
• A ban on snaring 
Scotland 2016  
• No tuition fees for Scottish students 
• Anti-fracking (cautious approach in 2015, moves to outright ban by 2016) 
• Every primary school to have breakfast club (2015 talked of a pilot scheme) 
• Investment in 30,000 apprenticeships each year. (In 2015, reference to ‘thousands more’). 
• Anti-independence but support for the new powers coming to Scottish Parliament 
Wales 2011 
• Commitment to renewables and low carbon economy and communities  
• Increase spending on education (more detail in 2011, including doubling numbers with 
access to Flying Start programme)  
• Cancer Key Worker  
• National Literacy Plan 
• Continuation of free prescriptions 
Wales 2016 
• Increased spending on health and social services 
• Improving road networks in Wales 
• Prioritising mental health treatment  
• Increased funding for schools; continuation of 21st century schools building programme  
• Keeping student fees as low as possible: 2016 involves a ‘better package of student support, 





Table 7: Reference to other parties  
  Britain   Scotland   Wales   
 01 05 10 15 17 01 05   10 15 17 01 05 10 15 17 
Conservatives/Tories 39 27 14 13 75 47 32 17 13 59 47 34 31 40 80 
Lib Dems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 








Table 8: Britain and the Union (number of times terms used) 
 Britain Scotland Wales 
 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Britain/British 153 86 132 72 83 106 74 112 51 76 147 75   13 78 76 
UK/United 
Kingdom 
36 30   25 15 30 38 52   41 48 96 36 39   37 68 109 
Union/Unionist* 1 0 2 3 0 1 0 6 1 1   1  0    0 5 0 
Scotland/Scottish 10 2 3 8 15 256 249 185 236 280   3 2  2 5 13 
Wales/Welsh 10 3 7 11 14 3 3 5 0 4   204  216  360 335 441 
England/English*
* 
9 8 4 12 15 7 3 7 4 11   11    3   7 26 31 
Devolution/ de- 
volved powers to 
Scotland & Wales 
4 12 4 7 14 3 15 11 16 15    13  18     4  21 20 





Table A1: General election manifestos analysed 
Labour Party 
(British) 
2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Scottish Labour 
Party 
2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Welsh Labour 
Party 
2001 2005 2010 2015 2017 
Note: All party manifestos used in the analysis are publicly available documents 
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